Does the moral argument undercut the problem of evil?

Adam: It is often wondered whether evil gives reason to believe there is no god. There are many such responses to this idea. One is to suggest that although at first appearance suggests that evil ‘counts against’ god, further sober enquiry reveals that this is no evidence at all. Theism can provide a similarly good explanation. In a sense, we give ‘God’s alibi’ to the prosecution to the argument from evil.

Alternatively, and more recently, a popular response is that of sceptical Theism: Namely, the principle that we simply aren’t in a position to judge whether the evils we observe really count against God. We simply aren’t able to judge the matter. Instead of God’s alibi, we simply show that our trial could never reach a safe verdict in the first place.

Also, one can simply accept that the balance of evil in the world really does, taken alone, suggest there is no God. However, this only considers evil alone. Considering the rest of the available evidence, we observe that there are much greater reasons in favour of God.

However one common objection, amongst popular sources at least, is to appeal to morality itself to ‘trump’ the argument from evil. When Atheist offers an argument from evil, Theist says some variant of “Well, to run the argument from evil in the first place, you need some account of what good and evil is. Yet the only plausible source of value is God.”

Evil shifts the burden of proof onto Theism

Abstract

The discussion of the problem of evil has developed from a logical disproof, to an inductive argument, to an abductive inference. Here an even more modest approach to using evil is suggested: that evil shows that the prior probability of Theism must be very low, prior to any further investigation. This approach sidesteps the standard defences to the problem of evil, and thus indeed permits Atheist to adopt a more defensive strategy. All they need to do is show that the balance of arguments that may be offered do not shift this prior assignment.

What makes a good argument?

Claire: We argue a lot, yet what do we need to do to be convinced by it? What makes some arguments good, and others bad? How should we assess an argument, and whether or not to believe it?

Adam: Take a recent example. William Lane Craig offers something called a Kalam Cosmological argument, which runs like this:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist

C) The universe had a cause.

The argument is valid – that is, the conclusions follow from the premises (). The question is whether the premises are true. Craig’s standard conception of what makes a good argument is whether or not the premises are more plausible than their negations.

Some Atheists on youtube disagreed this would be enough. Suppose that you do find each premise more plausible than it’s negation, but not by much: so you assign something like P=0.6 for each premise. Yet, they urge, given this the probability of the conclusion is only around 0.36, so you shouldn’t accept it. Craig doesn’t think much of them.